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Abstract 
The Variable Interest Entity (‘VIE’) has long been a well-accepted structure for foreign 
investors within sectors that concern China’s investment restrictions. They are also utilised as 
a means by which Chinese domestic entities can list overseas on capital markets 
internationally. From a regulatory perspective, despite there being no clear prohibition 
regarding the VIE structure in China, there has also been no specific endorsement of the VIE 
structure either. Consequently, the VIE structure has remained a grey area within the Chinese 
legal system. Though the VIE structure permits both foreign and domestic investors to 
circumvent governmental regulations and reviews, this simultaneously means that the VIE 
structure hazardously lacks the backing of the relevant authorities which presents a number 
of legal and regulatory risks. Thus the future of China’s VIEs is based upon its anticipated 
creation of a genuinely level playing field and an improved rule-of-law environment for all 
market players; so as to render any VIE-type structure redundant and prevent further 
uncertainty from infiltrating the investment sector. 
 
Introduction 
The Variable Interest Entity (‘VIE’) is a well-established and widely utilised structure of 
investment employed throughout the foreign investment sector in China.1 The structure 
entails a succession of contractual arrangements that hold the principal function of 
circumventing the investment restrictions that the Chinese government has placed upon 
foreign ownership in particular sectors of the market.2 Consequently, the legal validity of VIEs 
has been a point of contention since its very inception. The Sina Corporation was the first 
                                                          
*LLb. Graduate University of Kent 2015. 
1 Z. Xianwu & B. Lihui, ‘Variable Interest Entity Structure in China’ (China Law Insight, February 2012) 
<www.chinalawinsight.com/2012/02/articles/corporate/foreign-investment/variable-interest-entity-
structure-in- china/> accessed 14/04/2014. 
2 D Barboza, ‘A Loophole Poses Risks to Investors in Chinese Companies’ (N.Y. Times, 23/01/2012) 
<http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/01/23/a-loophole-poses-risks-to-investors-in-chinese-companies> 
accessed 25/07/2015. 
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company to successfully investigate the uncertain environment surrounding the VIE, when it 
was publicly listed on the NASDAQ in 2000.3 In general, the Chinese authorities approved the 
use of the structure and in consequence the structure has been broadly implemented 
throughout foreign investment in China.4 This has aided, among other things, a number of the 
most renowned Chinese enterprises by facilitating their acquirement of foreign capital and 
finalising offshore listings, notwithstanding the legal restrictions.5 
This is due to China’s new leaders being encouraged to choose a path of economic 
liberalism, in order to evade slowing or blocking the development model. Such an approach 
is exemplified by recent declarations made by Party officials; for example President Xi, who 
pledged that China would dedicate itself to constructing a ‘level playing field’ for all market 
players.6 Also, Premier Li introduced positive alterations to the restrictions placed upon 
foreign investments such as VIEs,7 and the year 2012 was the first time China’s banks 
extended a higher number of loans to private companies, than to state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs),8 both of which are encouraging for parties to VIEs. 
However, one must remain mindful that, in reality, these are comparatively small 
changes. The intermittent public quarrels between the different parties to the VIE 
arrangement and the unclear and often contradictory approaches of various regulatory 
bodies highlight the drawbacks that continue to plague the VIEs.9 Furthermore, the enduring 
lack of clarity, transparency and equality between the parties to the VIE structure, evidence 
that sincere shifts in policy of greater proportions is required in order to truly impact the 
                                                          
3 R. Pearson, ‘Looking at Chinese VIEs’ (Forbes, 18/10/2012) 
<http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardpearson/2012/10/18/looking-at-chinese-
vies>accessed20/07/2015. 
4 Ibid. 
5 These include Baidu, Sina Corp, Sohu.com, Netease, Tencent, Renren, Dangdang, New Oriental Education 
and Alibaba. 
6 V. Ruan, ‘Xi Jinping Pledges Level-Playing Field for Global Investors’ (The South China Morning Post, April 
2013) <http:// www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1210311/xi-jinping-pledges-level-playing-field-global- 
investors> accessed 05/05/2014. 
7 D. Barboza & C. Buckley, ‘China Plans to Reduce the State's Role in the Economy’ (The New York Times, 
May 2013) <https:// www.google.com.hk/search?q=China+Plans+to+Reduce+the+State%E2%C80% 
99s+Role+in+the+Economy,+the+New+York+Times&source=univ&tbm=nws&tbo=u&sa=X&ei=2LGkUd3jJ
eWXiQf4_ 4CADg&ved=0CC4QqAI&biw=1260&bih=620> accessed 27/04/2014. 
8 ‘Shadows Lengthen: Chinese Credit Rises. China's Credit Rating Falls’ (The Economist, April 2013) 
<http:// www.economist.com.hk/news/china/21576134-chinese-credit-rises-chinas-credit-rating-falls-
shadows- lengthen> accessed 28/04/2014. 
9 M. N. Goldberger & L. Krabill, ‘Fraud Prevalent in Reverse Merger Companies with Operations in China’ 
(2011) Ballard Spahr LLP <http://www.ballardspahr.com/AlertsPublications/Articles/2011-07- 
08_Fraud_Prevalent_in_Reverse_Merger_Companies_with_Operations_in_China> accessed 27/07/2015. 
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perilous ambiguity rife within the structure.10 
The urgency of the need for such change is demonstrated by the rising uncertainty felt by the 
relevant parties as they are forced to continue operating upon the basis of speculation, in 
spite of the minor improvements in leadership attitude.11 This brings many to the conclusion 
that such legal ambiguity needs to be dealt with before China potentially jeopardises the 
confidence of foreign investors in its economic markets and loses the key competitive status 
it requires in order to attract and retain foreign investors.12 This paper shall argue that in the 
thirty-five years since China began concerted efforts of economic reform, a status of limbo 
has formed around the VIE structure. In consequence this exposes the institutional challenges 
that confront the ‘state capitalism’ model of China, including attempts to both maintain and 
broaden the Party-state’s level of control.13 Henceforth, the future prospects of VIEs in China 
are dependent upon the way in which Chinese policy-makers decide to earnestly respond to 
these institutional challenges. This paper has six parts. Following this introduction, Part II 
introduces a general analysis of the origins and structure of the VIE, taking into consideration 
the reasons why the VIE structure was brought into existence. Part III will take a look at the 
horizontal risks associated with VIEs and the perilous nature of the VIE contract. Part IV will 
then explore the associated domestic vertical risks and regulatory measures, as well as case 
examples of selective enforcement, the core vertical risk currently plaguing VIEs. Part V will 
look at the offshore vertical risks related to the VIE structure, such as tax related issues and 
the potentially hazardous outcomes. Part VI concludes the paper by discussing the future of 
the VIE structure and the ways in which the VIE, as well as its surrounding factors of influence, 
could be altered by investors and the Chinese government in order to bring much needed 
clarification to this sector of investment. 
 
II. General Analysis of the Origins and Structure of the VIE 
China operates in a self-defined ‘socialist market economy’ and is unitarily ruled by the 
Chinese Communist Party (‘CCP’). Throughout the Maoist era (1949-78), foreign direct 
                                                          
10 V. Lo & X. Tian, Law for Foreign Business and Investment in China (Routledge, 2009) page 364. 
11 ‘Legal Analysis on Recent Rulings Related to VIE Structure’ (Han Kun Law Offices Memorandum, 8 July 
2013) < www.hankunlaw.com/backuser/picinfo/20137811354.pdf> accessed 15/04/2014. 
12 S. Wei, ‘Will the Door Open Wider in the Aftermath of Alibaba? - Placing (or Misplacing) Foreign 
Investment in a Chinese Public Law Frame’ [2012] 42 HKLJ 561, page 582-583. 
13 Ibid. 
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investment in China was almost non-existent and historically, the anti-commercial traditions 
underlying Confucian ideology dominated and therefore merchants were assigned a low 
status.14 In more recent times, throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, China was 
exploited and colonised by the Western military and then forced to trade.15 Consequently, 
intense hostility was felt toward the West, as well as a strong desire to recuperate autonomy 
over its trade and commerce sectors.16 The demise of Mao Zedong proved to be a key turning 
point in the path to China’s economic modernisation.17 In 1978, with a view to commencing 
necessary economic reforms, the new CCP leadership, led by Deng Xiaoping, instigated a 
ground-breaking new ‘Open-Door’ policy.18  This was introduced with the intention of utilising 
“market mechanisms and foreign resources” in order to stimulate economic growth.19 For 
example, by the 1990s, economic reforms had accelerated to the point where the 
“conventional state planning system” was transformed into “a more market-oriented macro-
economic regulation and control regime.”20 However, despite the new leaders of the CCP in 
the post-Mao era developing enduring and substantial policy alterations for economic reform, 
they did not go as far as to broadly reverse the objectives promulgated during the previous 
era.21 In spite of progressive changes in policy, protectionist attitudes persisted in the shape 
of regulatory restrictions of investments from outside China throughout a number of different 
industries.22 The contrasting treatment of Chinese and non-Chinese investments has proved 
to be a longstanding policy instituted by the CCP and is viewed as likely to persist into the 
                                                          
14 X. Zhang, ‘Historical Attitudes and Implications for Path Dependence: FDI Development and 
Institutional Changes in China’ [2004] Erim. Rep. Series Res. In MGMT, page 11. 
15 G. Finch, ‘Modern Chinese Constitutionalism: Reflections of Economic Change’ [2007] Williamette J. 
INT’L.L.& DISP. RESOL., page 77. 
16 A. Berger, The Politics of China’s Investment Treaty-Making Program in ‘The Politics of International 
Economics Law’ (Tomer Broude, 2011). 
17 M. Elliot, ‘Thirty Years After Deng: The Man Who Changed China’, TIME, 10/12/2008 
<http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1865539,00.html> accessed 27/07/2015. 
18 A. E. Csordas, ‘Funding Entrepreneurial Ventures in China: Proposals to More Effectively Regulate 
Chinese Foreign Private Issuers’ [2012] 38 Brook. J. INT’L. L., page 373. 
19 W. I. Friedman, Alumni Article, ‘One Country, Two Systems: The Inherent Conflict between China’s 
Communist Politics and Capitalist Securities Market’ [2002] 27 Brook. J. INT’L. L., page 477. 
20 S. Wei, ‘Dark Past, Grey Present or Bright Future? –Foreign Investors’ Access to China’s 
Telecommunications Industry and a Political Economy Analysis of Recent Industrial Policy Moves’ [2012] 
J. World INV. & Trade, page 513. 
21 D. Schindelheim, ‘Variable Interest Entity Structures in the People’s Republic of China: Is Uncertainty for 
foreign Investors Part of China’s Economic Development Plan?’ [2012] 21 Cardozo J. INT’L & COMP. L., 
page 198. 
22 S. Wei, ‘Will the Door Open Wider in the Aftermath of Alibaba? – Placing (or Misplacing) Foreign 
Investment in a Chinese Public Law Frame’ [2012] 42 H.K.L.J., page 561. 
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foreseeable future.23 Furthermore, it is believed by some that the CCP may be considering a 
return to a more protectionist regime, propelled by a growing sense of nationalist pride and 
a drive to retain homegrown Chinese companies under governmental control.24 
Since its proliferation in 1995, the centrepiece of the CCP’s FDI policy has been the 
Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries (the ‘Catalogue’).25 The present 
version of the Catalogue explicitly assigns three categories to more than four hundred 
industry sectors; the categories are designated as either ‘encouraged’, ‘restricted’, or 
‘prohibited’.26 In sectors not specifically listed in the catalogue, non-Chinese investments are 
deemed ‘permitted’ and those investments situated in the ‘restricted’ category necessitate 
government approval.27 Finally, the category that is of greatest relevance to this article is the 
‘prohibited’ category of investments, which are technically banned under Chinese law.28 
Notably, the value-added telecommunications (VAT) services and the Internet sector, where 
the VIE structure is used most prevalently, are categorised as ‘prohibited’ and disallow non- 
Chinese ownership.29 
However, as the Chinese saying goes, “The law is strong, but the outlaws are ten times 
stronger.”30 It is clear that China’s VIEs have been brought into existence as a result of the 
present special market conditions and investment regulations that have amalgamated within 
the Chinese economy. In spite of the intrinsic risky aspects of the VIE structure, many market 
players submit that, in view of the restrictions enforced against them by PRC regulations and 
laws, the VIE structure is the best available option to help them accomplish their commercial 
goals. Essentially, the VIE structure comprises a series of contracts that are entered into 
                                                          
23 H. Huang, ‘The Regulation of Foreign Investment in Post-WTO China: a Political Economy Analysis’ 
[2009] 23 COLUM. J. Asian L., page 185. 
24 V. Bath, ‘Foreign Investment, the National Interest and National Security – Foreign Direct Investment in 
Australia and China’ [2012] 34 Sydney L. REV., page 32. 
25 L. Wanqiang, ‘Chinese Foreign Investment Laws: A Review form the Perspective of Policy-oriented 
Jurisprudence’ [2011] 19 Asia PAC. L. REV., page 35. 
26 J. G. Sasser, ‘China Risk factor Hiding in Plain View: A Brief Analysis of Variable Interest Entities (VIEs) 
Under Cihnese Law’ [November 2012] TENN. Corp. newsl. Available at: 
<http://www.frostbrowntodd.com/resources-1527.html> accessed 25/07/2015. 
27 n. 21. 
28 C. Chen, ‘The Evolution and Main Features of China’s FDI Laws and Policies’ (2011) in: Foreign Direct 
Investment in China: Location Determinants, Investor differences and Eocnomic Impacts, page 60. 
29 S. Dickinson, ‘VIEs in China. The End of a Flawed Strategy’ (China L. Blog, 10/10/2011) 
<http://www.chinalawblog.com/2011/10/vies_in_china_the_end_of_a_flawed_strategy.html> accessed 
25/07/2015. 
30 W. Zhong, ‘Dark Days for China’s Whistleblowers’ (Asia Times, 26/03/2009) 
<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KC26Ad01.html> accessed 27/07/2015. 
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between a completely foreign-owned company (WFOE), a Chinese domestic company (VIE) 
and Chinese individuals who have possession of the VIE. A foreign parent company that 
directly or indirectly owns the WFEO is, in addition, instituted in what is usually a tax haven 
by the same Chinese persons that possess the VIE. The foreign investors customarily include 
venture capitalists (VC) and private equity (PE) firms and China’s contractual arrangements 
intend to grant the foreign parent company de facto control of the VIE in question.31 It is 
referred to as a ‘variable interest’ due to the fact that the controlling interest held by the 
foreign parent company in the VIE is not founded on the majority of voting rights, but rather 
on contracts. This type of contractual control does not meet the requirements of equity 
ownership in form; however substantively, it aims to achieve the same effect.32 Though the 
concept of the VIE originated from accounting principles in the US, it is a structure of 
investment that is heavily entrenched with Chinese characteristics. The US General Accepted 
Accounting Principles require the reporting entity to consolidate the VIE’s financials, 
providing that the reporting entity is the VIE’s primary beneficiary.33 This type of legislation in 
the US intends to prevent off-balance-sheet liabilities that may be hidden within the special 
purpose entities (SPE) of the reporting company and may otherwise go undetected, causing 
systemic risks.34 
China’s VIEs are distinctive due to the fact that they do not seek to hide liabilities in 
the VIE, instead Chinese domestic businesses and foreign investors aim to gain SPE regulation 
in order to consolidate the financials of the VIE as a type of asset on their balance sheet. 35 
This is conducted with a view to attracting public investors from the international capital 
market, while simultaneously bypassing the investment restrictions of China.36 Thus, from the 
standpoint of Chinese domestic companies, the dominant incentive to adopt the VIE structure 
                                                          
31 R. Lee, ‘Understanding the VIE Structure: Necessary Elements for Success and the Legal Risks Involved’ 
(Clients & Friends Memo, August 2011), <www.martindale.com/members/Article_Atachment.aspx? 
od=296452&id=1328574&filename=asr-1328576.Understanding.pdf > accessed 13/03/2014. 
32 Z. Wang, ‘US-listed Chinese Firms in Credibility Crisis: Who Are They? Where Are They?’ (2012) 
Columbia 
University Journal <http://ssr.com/abstract=2177450> accessed 24/07/2015. 
33 Financial Accounting Standards Board Interpretation No. 46: Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities. 
34 J. Steel, ‘Variable Interest Entities (VIEs), Qihoo 360 and China’ (Hedge Fund Consulting and Short 
Equity Research, May 2012 < www.shortzilla.com/variable-interest-entities-vie-qihoo-360-and-china> 
accessed 25/03/2014. 
35 See: Z. Wang, n.29, for examples of the public listings typically used. 
36 Ibid. 
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is to obtain foreign capital.37 
Furthermore, banks in China often lack incentive to lend funds to private enterprises 
due to ideological concerns, government interference in relation to bank lending and the 
presence of the local government’s explicit or implicit guarantees for loans to SOEs.38 
Moreover established stock markets in the early 1990s in areas such as Shanghai and 
Shenzhen were almost exclusively utilised for the reform of the SOEs.39 Therefore private 
entrepreneurs were, for a long period, forced to predominantly depend upon self-financing, 
in view of their restricted access to bank loans and domestic stock markets.40 At the end of 
1999, the private sector was contributing 27% of GDP, however it only accounted for 1% of 
lending from banks and 1% of listed companies on the domestic stock exchanges.41 This 
situation is worsened by the burdensome process of approval and the complete ban taken 
against seeking foreign capital in overseas markets.42 This, in effect, compels private 
enterprises in China to turn to more creative ways of obtaining capital, the most controversial 
of which is VIEs, which consistently draw headlines around the world.43 A survey carried out 
in 2011 found that 42% of the 230 US-listed Chinese companies were utilising the VIE 
structure and the majority alluded to the restraints placed on offshore listings as the primary 
reason for their adopting the VIE structure.44 
A policy that appears to have inadvertently promoted the status of VIEs in foreign 
investment in China was promulgated by the Provisions for the Acquisition of Domestic 
Enterprises by Foreign Investors (M&A Rules) in 2006.45 It is provided by Article 11 that in a 
context where a domestic company merges its affiliated domestic company in the name of a 
                                                          
37 P. Gillis, ‘Variable Interest Entities in China’ (Forensic Asia, September 2012) 
<www.chinaaccountingblog.com/vie-2012septaccountingmatte.pdf> accessed 23/04/2014. 
38 S. Lubman, The Evolution of Law Reform in China: An Uncertain Path (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2012) page xxvii—xxix. 
39 N. Gregory, S. Tenev & D. Wagle, China's Emerging Private Enterprises: Prospects for the New Century 
(International Finance Corporation, 2000)  page 66. 
40 Ibid. 
41 N. Gregory & S. Tenev, ‘The Financing of Private Enterprise in China’ (2001) 38 Finance & Development 
page 1 < www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/03/gregory.htm> accessed 25/04/2014. 
42 n. 29. 
43 n. 36. 
44 P. Gillis, ‘Statistics on VIE Usage’ (China Accounting Blog, April 2011) 
<www.chinaaccountingblog.com/weblog/statistics-on-vie-usage.html> accessed 15/04/2014. 
45 S. Luk, ‘Certain Recent Entrepreneurial Responses to China's Mergers and Acquisitions Rules’ 
(Bloomberg Finance LP) < 
www.winston.com/sitefiles/publications/d251d3badfe41705f62637cd143eeda3.pdf> accessed 
17/04/2014. 
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controlled overseas company, it is necessary for it to attain approval from the Ministry of 
Commerce (MOFCOM). As a result, this makes it particularly difficult to employ an offshore 
financing technique known as round-trip investments.46 In contrast, the VIE structure, which 
employs contractual control instead of share ownership control and thus poses the best 
alternative in order to avoid prompting the commencement of the “clumsy, burdensome, 
uncertain, time- consuming and costly approval process”.47 In consequence, the VIE structure 
has seen a substantial expansion in usage within more traditional asset-based industries. If 
the VIE structure and its associated risks continue to remain a theoretical and unlikely 
occurrence, then this trend looks set to further increase. 
 
III. Horizontal Risks of VIEs: the Perilous Nature of the VIE Contract 
The crucial component of a VIE structure is composed of two wide categories of contractual 
arrangements between the VIE and the WFOE: the profit-extraction mechanism and the 
control mechanism.48 The former primarily concentrates upon the cash flow of the group and 
holds a significant function in extending a loan to Chinese partners in order to capitalise the 
VIE, as well as channel the profits of the VIE into the foreign parent company via the WFOE. 
The loan agreement is entered into between the WFOE and their Chinese partners who will 
then reimburse the loan using the dividends attained from the VIE. An exclusive consulting or 
technical service agreement will also be concluded between the VIE and WFOE, and the 
services proffered will vary by industry or company. Consequently, all of the profits of the VIE 
can be directed to the WFOE and serve as payment for the provision of service.49 In reality, 
companies are inclined to complement the technical service agreement with additional 
contractual arrangements, such as a trademark licensing contract, in return for royalty fees.50 
Thus, the foreign parent company is concurrent with the VIE’s commercial performance.51 
                                                          
46 D. Chase, ‘VIE Structure in China Faces Scrutiny’ (Clifford Chance Client Briefing, October 2011) 
<www.cliffordchance.com/publicationviews/publications/2011/10/vie_structure_ 
inchinafacesscrutiny.html> accessed 09/04/2014. 
47 n. 9. 
48 D. Schindelheim, ‘Variable Interest Entity Structures in the People's Republic of China: Is Uncertainty for 
Foreign Investors Part of China's Economic Plan?’ (2012) 21 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 195, page 230-232. 
49 Ibid. 
50 n. 36. 
51 D. Roberts & T. Hall, ‘VIE Structures in China: What You Need to Know’ (O'Melveny & Myers Research 
Report, October 2011) 
<www.omm.com/files/Uploads/Documents/VIE%20Structures%C20in%C20China%20-. 
%20What%20You%C20Need%C20to%K¨now.pdf> accessed 26/05/2014. 
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In regard to the control mechanism, typically contracts will involve an equity pledge 
agreement, a call option agreement and a power of attorney.52 The role of the equity pledge 
is to act as the security for full compliance under the VIE by the Chinese partners holding 
other obligations under the VIE contracts.53 The call option, provides the WFOE with sole 
discretion in deciding whether to acquire the VIE at the set price imposed by the WFOE. The 
power of attorney bestows normal shareholder rights to the WFOE, such as the attendance 
of shareholders’ meetings and voting rights.54 These contractual arrangements have the 
effect of securing de facto control for foreign investors over the VIE as if they were the 
shareholders of it, while simultaneously circumventing the restrictions placed on foreign 
equity ownership by China.55 
However, the VIE structure’s chief advantage is also one of its weaknesses. In form it 
complies with the investment restriction on foreign ownership, however in substance it is 
non-compliant.56 In practice, for example, it is doubtful that the WFOE could successfully 
exercise the call option or acquire the VIE’s equity under the equity pledge agreement as the 
VIE structure is typically utilised in an industry where foreign equity ownership is disallowed.57 
The enforceability of these VIE contracts has so far not been directly tested and remains 
principally unsettled. However, it is in danger of being pronounced illegal or invalid for public 
policy related reasons, in pursuance of Art 52 of the PRC Contract Law.58 If this is accurate 
then a high level of damage could be incurred by foreign investors as the majority of the time, 
the offshore listed company encompasses no real assets apart from the contractual control it 
exercises over the domestic VIE. Therefore in effect, foreign investors are simply investing in 
that underlying contractual control.59 When business is prosperous and runs smoothly, then 
it becomes a win-win situation that suits both the domestic company’s desire for capital and 
the foreign investors’ want for access to the Chinese market.60 However, when prosperity 
begins to slow and disputes erupt between the beneficial and legal owners of the VIE, the 
                                                          
52 n. 29. 
53 n. 34. 
54 Ibid. 
55 P. Gillis, ‘Statistics on VIE Usage’ (China Accounting Blog, 11/04/2011) 
<http://www.chinaaccoutingblog.com/weblog/statistics-on-vie-usage.html> accessed 23/07/2015. 
56 n. 9. 
57 n. 29. 
58 n. 19, page 581. 
59 Ibid. 
60 n. 29. 
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precarious underlying contractual basis of the VIE structure becomes exposed. Regrettably, 
almost all foreign investors are confronted with these types of walk-outs from their Chinese 
partners. Often they opt to avoid the process of formal adjudication in China as they fear their 
own original infringement of the investment restrictions will be called into question. Thus, 
engagement in private negotiations is frequently resorted to with the Chinese partners. 
This article would like to highlight that such private settlements are of particular 
concern for the foreign investor because it is this party that is situated in a substantially 
disadvantageous position during the negotiations. It is this factor that Wickersham and Taft 
propose as the key factor which differentiates this form of bargaining from other sectors of 
the legal sphere, which similarly act ‘in the shadow of the law’.61 This is because the VIE 
arrangement signifies a clear and unarguable infringement of Chinese investment 
restrictions. However, such collusion between the two parties poses far less of a problem for 
the Chinese company because it is they who hold the rights to the contract on paper.62 
Therefore if, the Chinese authorities endeavoured to terminate the VIE and penalise those 
involved, or the contractual foundation of the VIE collapsed due to manipulation by the 
Chinese non-government parties; the consequences would impact the party of foreign 
investors to a significantly greater extent.63 The most well-known example of investors losing 
control over a China-domiciled company as a result of its Chinese owner disregarding the VIE 
agreement, is the Yahoo- Alibaba dispute in 2011, which shall be comprehensively analysed 
forthwith.64 
 
Case Analysis: The Alibaba Dispute and the Chinachem Case 
The Alibaba Dispute involved the two parties, Alibaba Group and Yahoo! Inc. Jack Ma, the 
Executive Chairman of Alibaba, terminated unilaterally the VIE structure and departed with 
Alipay, the core asset of the VIE. This left Yahoo! with no alternative but to participate in 
                                                          
61 W. Wickersham & M. Taft, ‘Understanding the VIE Structure: Necessary Elements for Success, and the 
Legal Risks Involved’ (Cadwalader, 10/08/2011) 
<http://www.cadwalalder.com/uploads/cfmemos/a6415b1795be964c293f513215.pdf> accessed 
23/07/2015. 
62 n. 48. 
63 S. M. Davidoff, ‘Fraud Heightens Jeopardy of Investing in Chinese Companies’ (N.Y. times, 24/04/2015) 
<http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/24/fraud-heightens-jeopardy-of-investing-in-chinese-
companies> accessed 23/07/2015. 
64 E. M. Rusli, ‘Yahoo and Alibaba Resolve Dispute Over Aliplay’ (N.Y. Times, 29/07/2011) 
<http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/29/yahoo-and-alibaba-resolve-alipay-dispute> accessed 
10/07/2015. 
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private negotiations with Jack Ma in order to try and recuperate as much of its investment as 
possible. Ultimately, Yahoo! was forced to relinquish its beneficial interest in the VIE and 
tackle class action lawsuits from US public investors.65 The VIE structure was ultimately 
abandoned by the parties, though the resulting compensation agreement allowed Yahoo! to 
still enjoy the economic benefits of Alipay before and after its IPO, or any other event of 
liquidity. However, the loss and controversy that ensued is a prime illustration of the key need 
for clarification in this sector and the detrimental results the lack of uncertainty can cause. 
The most recently publicised decision of the Supreme People’s Court fortunately came closer 
to judicially clarifying this topic. It involved the foreign investor Nina Wong’s Hong Kong 
company Chinachem Financial Services (Chinachem), which fought in the courts over a 
shareholding dispute for twelve years. However, it was met with a negative response by the 
region’s highest judicial authority.66 The dispute was founded upon a series of loan and 
entrustment agreements, which it entered into along with China Small and Medium 
Enterprise Investment Development (China SME). This was in order to invest in China 
Minsheng Banking Corporation, which was a section of the financial services that was off-
limits to foreign investors.67 As the relationship between Chinachem and ChinaSME 
deteriorated, China SME sought to leave the situation along with the shares it held in 
Minsheng, on the behalf of Chinachem. This proxy arrangement was deemed unenforceable 
by the Supreme People’s Court based upon the grounds that, the intentions of the 
arrangement involved the circumvention of China’s investment restrictions and thus were 
invalid as they constituted “concealing illegal intentions with a lawful form.”68 
This case immediately alarmed China’s VIEs, primarily because the rationale 
underlying this contractual arrangement is remarkably similar to their own actions of 
bypassing foreign investment restrictions imposed by the relevant Chinese authorities. It 
seems to indicate a clear precedent of the courts’ ability to resort to Article 52 of the PRC 
Contract Law in order to tackle contradicting VIE contracts.69 However, it is important to note 
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that the proxy arrangement viewed in the case involving Chinachem predates the surfacing 
of the current VIE structure and was a rather more crude form of foreign control in 
comparison to current VIEs. For example, VIE contracts now comprise a power of attorney, 
rather than the entrustment agreement utilised in Chinachem.70 Also, in the former, Chinese 
partners who held equity interests in the VIE are simply granted the rights associated with 
these interests to the WFOE in order to act as its proxy, which is allowed under PRC law.71 In 
comparison, the latter specifically provided that China SME, though they were registered 
owners of the shares in Minsheng, only held them on the behalf of Chinachem. The specific 
provision that Chinachem was the actual owner of the Minsheng shares in the entrustment 
agreement displays a more obvious type of noncompliance with Chinese legal restrictions.  
Secondly, the chief way in which VIEs can channel profits to the WFOE is via an 
exclusive consulting or technical service agreement, which is a legitimate way in which to 
direct profits through share dividends.72 This further demonstrates the illegal objectives that 
China SME encompassed by merely acting as the trustee of Chinachem by buying shares in 
Minsheng and consequently violating the legal restrictions.73 To conclude, as the illegal 
intentions viewed in the Chinachem case were significantly more obvious in regard to its 
entrustment agreement than the VIE structure, then it is reasonably clear why the Supreme 
People’s Court invalidated them without hesitation. More significantly, in view of the fact that 
China is not a common law jurisdiction, it does not treat preceding cases as binding authorities 
or even precedents; this makes the future status of VIEs even more difficult to predict. 
In sum, these incidences display the potential consequences of misaligned interests 
between the Chinese owners and the foreign investors.74 They are also a prime example of 
the unarguable bias of risk weighed against foreign investors in the VIE structure, which far 
outweighs those implicitly assumed when participating in various other tentatively illicit 
arrangements.75 In particular because the foreign investors of the VIE have very limited legal 
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recourse when disputes materialise over their control of the relevant company.76 For 
example, it is likely that if the VIE fails, by means of either managerial rift, Chinese government 
decree, or other governmental or operational decision, then it shall be exceedingly difficult 
for a foreign investor to utilise judicial means in order to recuperate their investment losses.77 
Henceforth, the investors may have no better alternative than to accept an inadequate 
remedy of the Chinese party’s choosing, as viewed in the Yahoo-Alibaba case.78 This peril is 
intensified by the following domestic and offshore risks associated with VIEs in addition. 
 
IV. Domestic Vertical Risks of VIEs 
Regulatory Uncertainty 
Regulatory uncertainty is the primary vertical risk factor of concern for the participants of 
Chinese VIEs. Though Sina obtained an approving opinion from the Ministry of Information 
Industry, wherein the company structure as well as its pre-IPO restructuring were Recognised 
in 2000, Chinese regulators have not since formally verified the legality of the VIE structure.79 
The questionable internal report prepared by the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) in September considered a general prohibition of the VIE structure; however, this 
turned out to be a mere research project by a low-rank official.80 Although it did instigate an 
unsettling feeling amongst market participants, reminding them of Beijing’s prior invalidation 
of the Chinese-Chinese-Foreign (CCF) structure in 1998.81 Despite this leaked report, no 
general prohibition of VIEs ever transpired; however, the stock prices of companies who 
utilised VIEs saw a sharp decline due to the surrounding speculation generated by the 
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report.82 
In spite of the absence of a general ban, there remain regulatory measures that have 
the potential to restrict the use of VIEs.83 The issues that foreign investors often encounter, 
regarding both the regulation of VIEs, as well as the business activities in China as a whole, 
centre upon the notably general style within which rules are drafted. Therefore they provide 
little indication as to their specific scope of implementation. An example of this is the circular 
published in July 2006 by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT Circular) 
on the topic of fortifying the administration of foreign investment in the VAT services sector.84 
It gives a subtle indication of the potential for concentrated efforts to be instigated against 
unsanctioned VIEs in the VAT industry.85 Though the provision seems to include language that 
seeks to wholly outlaw VIEs in this sector, it can also be inferred as a mere restriction on the 
use of VIEs. This includes the requirement for the Chinese company to possess the intellectual 
property it utilises and refrain from leasing, transferring or selling the VAT licence. The 
majority of VIEs conform to the latter rule, particularly because the Chinese domestic entity 
is typically one that functions the business in pursuance to the licence it holds and does not 
involve the transferral of the licence to the WFOE.86 This type of interpretative and uncertain 
approach is not satisfactory, predominantly because it may undermine the foundations of 
predictability and certainty that a free market economy is built upon and consequently 
increase the potential for selective enforcement or regulatory inconsistency.87 
In regard to the covert circumvention by VIEs of MOFCOM’s scrutiny of foreign M&A 
activities in China, there are also substantial vertical risks present. In view of Article 11 of the 
M&A Rules omitting to specifically reference the VIE or agreement-based control, foreign 
investors and Chinese companies avoid the associated foreign M&A approval process by way 
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of a VIE structure.88 Nevertheless, the provision of Article 11 seems to widen the scope of 
MOFCOM’s power by putting forward that “parties thereto shall not evade... by any other 
means”.89 It is unfortunate that this ambiguously drafted term fails to provide guidance as to 
whether the use of VIEs is permitted to circumvent the M&A approval process. 
Furthermore, for the reason of guiding foreign M&As, as well as safeguarding national 
security, the Provisions for the Implementation of the System for Security Review of 
Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (National Security Review) was 
promulgated by MOFCOM in 2011.90 Article 9 states that if the proposed activity can be 
incorporated within the scope of the merger and acquisition security review, then it is 
requisite for an application to be filed with MOFCOM.91 The overall provision and guidance of 
Article 9 is far more clear than that of Article 11 of the M&A Rules, particularly because it 
specifically refers to “agreement-based control”, which targets the VIE structure in a direct 
manner.92 Nonetheless, the national security review’s scope is restricted to national defence 
security issues, as well as national economic security issues and does not appear to invalidate 
the actual VIE structure.93 Once these regulatory measures have been reviewed, one can 
distinguish an increasing trend of scrutiny of VIEs by China’s regulators.94 Therefore, although 
it is doubtful that a complete ban will be introduced in the near future, it is possible that 
industry-wide constraints may be introduced in certain sectors. 
 
Selective Enforcement 
The second feature of the domestic vertical risks in regard to VIEs is regulatory inconsistency, 
also known as ‘selective enforcement’.95 Selective enforcement occurs when law enforcers 
derail the specified route of regulation or digress from the principle or objective established 
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by the regulation in question.96 Instead, they enforce regulations and execute laws by 
discretion, treating the same issues with different attitudes.97 Such a discretionary approach 
to law enforcement is practiced across many different sectors and many deem it is 
unfortunately showing signs of further proliferating throughout many sectors of Chinese 
law.98 This growing pattern of selective policy implementation is detrimental to China’s future 
economic development. For example, it is warned by K. J. O’Brien, an esteemed political 
scientist and prolific writer on Chinese social policy execution, that such an approach by 
Chinese authorities can turn a well-liked central policy promoting economic growth, into a 
harmful ‘local policy’ that may increase extraction levels and justify wasteful investment.99 
However, this article would like to highlight that the selective enforcement of this particular 
sector is of greater concern than others areas of the economy affected by this approach. This 
is predominantly due to the lack of published and specific criteria available to foreign 
investors as well as the aforementioned uncertainty emitted by the Chinese court decisions. 
This is naturally a legitimate concern for investors and adds an additional element of 
insecurity, in combination with the aforementioned domestic risks and unequal standing 
within the Chinese jurisdiction. 
 The VIE of Sina was endorsed by the Ministry of Information Industry in order to list it 
on NASDAQ.100 However, other VIEs have not been granted such preferential treatment and 
there is currently no official explanation as to what the distinguishing features were of Sina’s 
VIE. A Delaware Corporation, Buddha Steel, was compelled to withdraw its IPO application 
with the US Securities and Exchanges Commission (SEC) as local authorities in the Hebei 
Province abruptly invalidated its VIE on the grounds of public policy.101 This occurred while 
more than one hundred other companies employing VIEs had been successfully listed 
offshore with no invalidation from either the local or central government.102 According to 
some, this is believed to be a unique action that should not trigger angst regarding the legality 
                                                          
96 D. Chen, ‘Selective Enforcement of Regulation’ (2011) China Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 4, 
page 9. 
97 Ibid. 
98 M. Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy (Basic Books, New York, 1989) page 48-49. 
99 ‘Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China’ (1999) Comparative Politics, Vol. 31, No. 2, page. 167. 
100 F. Zhou & B. Zhang, ‘VIE Structure – a long untold story’ (Financial Worldwide, January 2014) < 
http://www.financierworldwide.com/vie-structure-a-long-untold-story/#.VbjCWvlViko> accessed 
24/07/2015. 
101 n. 20. 
102 Ibid. 
 KENT STUDENT LAW REVIEW     Volume 2 2015 
 
of the VIE structure in general.103 However, it should be noted that it is precisely this sort of 
selective enforcement that generates the greatest risks for foreign investors. If there are 
sufficient differences between Buddha Steel’s VIE and Sina’s VIE in order to warrant diverse 
treatment, then such differences should be clearly explained so that participants of the 
market can plan in accordance, in order to avoid a similar fate.104 Unfortunately, this has not 
occurred and so foreign investors are still in uncertain territory as they try to guess the 
reasoning for the invalidation of Buddha Steel. This is particularly harmful because it 
undermines the rule of law and promulgates a return to the model of ‘rule-by-law’, where 
law is a tool only utilised by public officials in order to govern the country.1051 Additionally, 
the Buddha Steel case alludes to the possible conflict of policy between local and central 
governments, which adds a further layer of vertical risks that foreign investors must maintain 
awareness of.106 
 
V. Offshore Vertical Risks of VIEs 
Invalidation and De-Listing of the Company 
In light of VIEs being predominantly used by Chinese companies to gain access to international 
capital markets, vertical risks inevitably arise from the offshore jurisdictions in which the 
company is listed. The primary risk associated with this is of being de-listed from that 
particular offshore market, therefore as the majority of foreign investors are investing in the 
contractual control of the VIE then it is of the highest importance that the actual contractual 
arrangement itself fulfils the necessity for consolidation.107 This should be in accordance with 
the relevant accounting principles, as well as be enforceable within the Chinese jurisdiction; 
thus, in turn, lowering the chance of invalidation by China’s regulators. In the alternative, 
foreign investors will stand to suffer substantial losses because the foreign listed company 
often does not have an operation of its own, in consequence it relies upon channelled profits 
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originating from the VIE in order to pay dividends to foreign investors.108 The horizontal risks 
and domestic vertical risks may widen their scope of impact onto offshore territory and it is 
the duty of the offshore securities to ensure satisfactory disclosure of these sorts of risks is 
made and potential accounting fraud is prevented. 
 
Taxation Issues 
In regard to accounting principles in the US, in pursuance of FASB Interpretation No. 46, the 
reporting company is permitted to consolidate another entity only if it possesses the right to 
receive the anticipated residual returns of the entity.109 This could pose specific problems for 
VIEs utilised in asset-heavy industries, in contrast to those which are asset-light, because 
foreign investors may be compelled to put the entirety of their operations into the VIE. 
Internet-related companies are diverse because they can place additional operations, such as 
advertising and programming, into the WFOE while the VIE only holds the section of the 
operations off-limits to the WFOE.110 This means that for the WFOEs of certain companies, 
such as Baidu and Sina, only rely on the VIE for some of their profit-making activities, while 
the private educational services, New Oriental Education and Technology Inc, might have to 
entirely rely upon its VIE for profits.111 This makes a significant impact upon the tax sector of 
the enterprise in question. 
 In reality, despite there being a profit-extraction mechanism in place, Gillis highlights 
that the majority of VIEs in asset-heavy industries do not seem to extend the service fee or 
royalty fee payment to the WFOE due to fears over the potential for adverse tax 
implications.112 If the VIE conveys profits to the WFOE, it shall incur the usual business tax set 
at 5 per cent on service payments.113 This is the associated cost of utilising VIEs, as such costs 
would not be incurred if the operations were carried out in the WFOE. Further, the higher the 
payment amount to the WFOE, the higher the level of business tax charged. There may also 
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be a transfer pricing adjustment associated, as the tax authorities in China may not allow a 
reduction to the VIE for the entirety or part of its fee payment to the WFOE in calculating the 
income tax of the VIE.114 Particularly due to the questionable nature of the action, wherein a 
company pays the entirety of its earnings for services, to another company. In view of the fact 
that the standard rate of corporate income tax in China is 25 per cent, the VIE may be required 
to pay a much higher level of income tax as a result of the transfer pricing adjustment.115 If 
the tax authorities have made the adjustment to the transfer price, then they may permit the 
WFOE to decrease its reported income when calculating its income tax, however the tax 
authorities may equally choose not to do this.116 Thus, the adverse tax implications 
associated with the transferral of profits from the VIE to the WFOE may, in effect, diminish 
the economic viability of the VIE structure.117 This is the foremost reason for why the VIE may 
choose to retain its profits instead of channelling them into a foreign parent company. This 
poses a concern for SEC, because the necessitation for consolidation may not have been 
originally satisfied. For example, in the case of New Oriental Education, 97 per cent of the 
revenues it had generated remained within the VIE; this raises the question of whether the 
revenue, in reality, belongs to the US-listed parent company and triggers investigation by the 
SEC.118 However, an answer to this cannot be given without prior direct clarification from the 
Chinese government. 
 
VI. The Future of the VIE Structure 
The perils faced by China’s VIEs are a microcosm of the broader institutional challenges that 
foreign investors are faced with when they perform business in China. It seems that the only 
way to improve the uncertain situation, making it more agreeable for both the investors and 
the Chinese government, is to specifically identify these institutional challenges. Then 
adjustments should be devised for both parties, so that the VIE structure is brought out of the 
murky waters currently surrounding it. In light of this, the author shall, at the end of this 
section, propose that VIEs should be fully legalised in order to begin to counteract the issues 
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associated with their uncertain status. 
 
Future Changes on the Part of the Chinese Government 
Greater Transparency 
In accordance with the annual Business Confidence Survey carried out by the European 
Chamber of Commerce, the greatest obstacle for market players in China is, “the discretionary 
enforcement of broadly drafted laws and regulations”.119 This was well exhibited in the 
conditional approval made by MOFCOM of Wal-Mart’s acquisition of the controlling stakes in 
Niuhai, which holds a VIE arrangement with Yishiduo.120 One of the attached conditions for 
this acquisition included that, Wal-Mart must expressly prohibit the use of the VIE structure 
in order to participate in Yishiduo’s VAT business.121 Chin and a number of others argue that 
this is the clearest message proffered by MOFCOM in regard to the use of VIEs.122 
Nonetheless, the “mushy and unclear” language utilised by MOFCOM triggered additional 
bouts of speculation.123 
The complexity of the case can be viewed in the overlapping nature of the competition 
law issues regarding foreign M&As and the restrictions placed on market access to foreign 
ownership in the VAT sector. Abrams put forward that the presence of the VIE within the case 
is just incidental to the competition law issue of market concentration.124 While others argue 
that this signifies one of the first moves toward outlawing VIEs; particularly when one takes 
into account the problematic market definition adopted by MOFCOM.125 Further, it is 
important to note that MOFCOM did not specifically invalidate the structure itself, thus 
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allowing speculation to continue to grow. Evidently, this indicates that Chinese regulators are 
aware of the existence of VIEs in China and their possible circumvention of Chinese 
regulations. In view of this, it should be stressed that these types of laws and regulations 
based upon inconsistent informalities, undermine the stability of the business environment 
that is required by a free modern economy in order to function and may slow China’s efforts 
toward achieving economic reform.126 The aforementioned instances of restriction can 
amalgamate into a force that can thoroughly shake the confidence of the market.127 In 
consequence, the regulatory uncertainty, lack of transparency and inconsistency may 
ultimately harm the investment environment and potentially the broader interests of the 
Party- state, such as China’s economic advancement. 
 
Greater Equality 
The absence of a level-playing field and general market access has long posed a significant 
problem for foreign investment in China. The utilisation of the VIE structure is both a creative 
and rational choice by foreign investors and Chinese private entrepreneurs under the special 
market conditions of China. China has experienced economic reforms for three and a half 
decades and is now positioned at a crossroads between economic liberalism and economic 
nationalism.128 The regimen is consistently faced with the dilemma of choosing between the 
continued rigid restrictions upon the facets of a free market economy and the development 
of a private sector in socialist China.129 
Foreign investment and private entrepreneurship are promoted to the extent that 
they will help to serve the interests of the Party-State. Although the drawback associated with 
this model is that the likely result of inefficient allocation and utilisation of capital and damage 
to productivity and innovation levels.130 Particularly now that the preliminary period of 
China’s economic reform and associated large investment projects prescribed by the State 
have begun to fade from the development agenda.131 As a result, the Chinese government’s 
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habitual bias against private enterprises and foreign investors is in urgent need of change and 
the promotion of fair and healthy market competition needs to be advanced.132 It is generally 
conceded that the ten-year Internet industry boom in China can be accredited to the 
employment of VIEs, which present a practicable alternative for the funding of Chinese 
private companies lacking in capital.133 This leads one to the conclusion that, if the Chinese 
government allowed foreign investors equal access to the market and means of gaining 
capital then it could raise the likelihood of this positive trend continuing and decrease the 
need for companies to use less orthodox structures. 
 
Legalisation of VIEs 
In light of the uncertainty and unpredictability currently associated with the VIE structure, 
this paper contends that China should take concerted steps toward specifically legalising VIEs. 
Such a move would signify an important advancement toward structuring a level- paying field 
for participants within the market and emit an inviting message to potential foreign investors 
into China. China’s SOEs do not require the employment of VIEs primarily because domestic 
stock markets and bank lending are readily available to them and the approval process is far 
more straightforward for them to list offshore.1341 Garrick points out that, comparatively, 
China’s private companies endure a harsh situation in their capital- starved state and have no 
alternative but to resort to creative ways in order to survive and continue to develop.135 
Therefore, if China is truly concerned about retaining control over certain sensitive sectors, 
then it could establish a multiple share structure and include some classes of shares whereby 
the voting rights are only issued to Chinese nationals.136 This would, at the very least, provide 
a suitable compromise in comparison to the precarious limbo status VIEs are currently 
situated within. 
 
 
Future Changes on the Part of Investors 
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The Multi-Jurisdictional Captive Company 
A potential replacement for the VIE structure has begun to surface, known as the Multi- 
Jurisdictional Captive Company (MJCC), which asserts that it provides better legal protection 
to foreign investors.137 The chief distinguishing feature of the MJCC structure is a custodian 
arrangement, which places shares in the VIE as a neutral third party, rather than with the 
Chinese founders of the VIE.138 It will function in a similar manner to an escrow account held 
by a bank and aims to tackle the horizontal risk of a rogue Chinese shareholder walking away 
from the VIE after a conflict of interest between the Chinese and foreign parties. However, it 
fails to address the fundamental problem of legality as it is uncertain whether all of the 
contractual arrangements, including the new custodian agreement, would be enforceable 
within a Chinese court.139 Thus it seems like the MJCC structure will not be in proper use by 
companies in the near future, as it will take time for it to become a workable alternative. 
However, it is certainly something that investors and the Chinese government should keep in 
mind if a practicable compromise cannot be reached regarding the VIE structure. 
 
Improvement of Corporate Governance 
A second alteration that could be made by the investing party, is to exert stronger corporate 
governance controls over the operating company and the WFOE. This may help to mitigate 
the risk of the operating company or any of its subsidiaries being transferred out of the 
structure of the VIE agreement.140 Furthermore, foreign investors should ensure that the 
necessary ancillary documents are in order so that control can be taken of the operating 
company under the VIE agreement if it becomes necessary to do so.141 These protectionist 
controls could be furthered by diversifying the shareholding and the board of directors of the 
VIE. This would maximise the alignment of interests between the beneficial and legal owners 
of the VIE, which would then minimise the likelihood of conflict and subsequent court 
involvement.142 
                                                          
137 T. Burroughs, ‘China's VIEs: A Political Football’ (Asia Venture Capital Journal, April 2013) <http:// 
www.avcj.com/avcj/analysis/2263609/chinas-vies-a-political-football> accessed 01/05/2014. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid. 
140 n. 18. 
141 Ibid. 
142 n. 9. 
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It is interesting to note that Gillis proposes, if a proportion of these measures were 
implemented then the VIE structure may even be rendered obsolete, as the conditions of 
China’s market would be such, that illegal measures would not need to be resorted to in order 
to gain access and compete equally within the market.143 This process will be assisted if the 
Chinese government chooses to follow the school of economic liberalism, over nationalism.144 
In the meantime it is believed to be unlikely that China will completely invalidate VIEs due to 
their wide usage within key businesses, as well as its employment within multiple Chinese 
national champion companies.145 
 
Concluding Remarks 
This article has positioned the intrinsic hazards associated with VIEs, including the vertical and 
horizontal risks, within the broader context of foreign investment in China so that one can 
more easily appreciate the greater legal and business environment and the encumbering 
institutional challenges that China is currently faced with. As viewed in the path of 
development from the CCF structure to the VIE and on to the new MJCC structure, market 
participants have a tendency to bend the rules to fit their own objectives. Thus, a satisfactory 
resolution for the VIE problem cannot be found via a simple and straightforward alteration to 
the structure itself. Therefore, it is highly likely that market participants shall develop new 
methods by which to work around any ban introduced on VIEs. The core of the subject 
ultimately centres upon how China chooses to respond to the root of the issue, the 
investment restrictions placed on foreign ownership in certain sectors of the market, that 
gives rise to the utilisation of the VIE structure. Simultaneously, the associated institutional 
challenges should be addressed in order to evoke effective economic reform. A truly level 
playing field, as well as a better rule-of-law environment will inevitably benefit China in the 
long term and potentially render any VIE-type structure redundant to market players in 
future. 
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